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Special Economic Zones: What Have We Learned?
Thomas Farole
Ask three people to describe an SEZ and three very different 
images may emerge. The first person may describe a fenced-in 
industrial estate in a developing country, populated by foot-
loose multinational companies enjoying tax breaks, with labor-
ers in garment factories working in less than optimal condi-
tions. In contrast, the second person may recount the “miracle 
of Shenzhen,” a fishing village transformed into a cosmopolitan 
city of 14 million, with per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) growing 100-fold in the 30 years since it was designated 
as an SEZ. A third person may think about places like Dubai or 
Singapore, whose ports serve as the basis for a wide range of 
trade- and logistics-oriented activities. 
In fact, all three of these descriptions are appropriate. These 
descriptions highlight the diverse ways in which the concept of 
“special” economic zones has been operationalized and under-
score the challenge of attempting to say anything specific about 
such a heterogeneous instrument. SEZs are typically estab-
lished with the aim of achieving one or more of the following 
four policy objectives (FIAS 2008): 
(i)  Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI); 
(ii)  Serving as “pressure valves” to alleviate large-scale unem-
ployment; 
(iii)  Supporting a wider economic reform strategy; and 
(iv)  Acting as experimental laboratories for the application of 
new policies and approaches. 
Since the 1970s, starting in East Asia and Latin America, 
zones have been designed to attract investment in labor-intensive 
manufacturing from multinational corporations. SEZs became 
a cornerstone of trade and investment policy in countries shift-
ing away from import-substitution policies and aiming to inte-
grate into global markets through export-led growth policies. 
Economic zones have had a mixed record of success to date, 
and they have remained controversial, both on economic and 
social grounds. In any case, since the mid-1980s, the number of 
new zones has increased rapidly, with dramatic growth in devel-
oping countries. For example, in 1986, the International La-
bour Organization’s (ILO) database of SEZs reported 176 zones 
in 47 countries; by 2006 this rose to 3,500 zones in 130 coun-
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tries (Boyenge 2007). The rise of traditional export processing 
zones (EPZs), and their success in contributing to export-led 
growth in regions like East Asia, is partially attributable to an 
unprecedented era of trade and investment globalization that 
started in the 1970s and accelerated during the 1990s and 
2000s, driven by the fragmentation of manufacturing into geo-
graphically dispersed global production networks. 
Traditional EPZs were designed to attract investment by en-
abling countries to better exploit a key source of comparative 
advantage—low-cost labor—that was otherwise underutilized 
because of low levels of domestic investment and barriers (reg-
ulatory, infrastructure, and so forth) preventing FDI. These 
EPZs have operated under simple principles: allow investors to 
import and export free of duties and exchange controls; facili-
tate licensing and other regulatory processes; and (usually) re-
duce or eliminate these firms from obligations to pay corporate 
taxes, value-added taxes (VAT), or other local fees. To maintain 
control, EPZs have normally been fenced-in estates with strict 
customs controls at entry, and sales are typically restricted 
mainly to export markets.
The model has been extremely successful in many coun-
tries. For example, it allowed the Dominican Republic to create 
more than 100,000 manufacturing jobs and shift dramatically 
away from reliance on agriculture. Similar stories of industrial-
ization and job creation can be seen in Mauritius, the Republic 
of Korea, Taiwan, Honduras, El Salvador, Madagascar, and 
more recently in Bangladesh and Vietnam. However, it is clear 
that this model is now increasingly running up against its limi-
tations. Indeed, it is perhaps no longer fit-for-purpose, given the 
changing macroeconomic and regulatory environment in the 
global economy. This creates significant challenges for develop-
ing countries that are still in the early stages of their zone pro-
grams. Some of the basic principles at the heart of traditional 
EPZs are no longer (or perhaps never were) sustainable sources 
of competitiveness. 
In the postcrisis environment, in which competition for FDI 
is likely to remain much more intense than it was in the past, 
SEZs are likely to continue to grow in importance. But it is not 
the existence of an SEZ regime, a compelling master plan, or 
even a fully built-out infrastructure that will make the differ-
ence in attracting investment, creating jobs, and generating 
spillovers to the local economy. Rather, it is the relevance of the 
SEZ programs in the specific context in which they are intro-
duced, and the effectiveness with which they are designed, im-
plemented, and managed on an ongoing basis that will deter-
mine success or failure.
The remainder of this note outlines key lessons that have 
emerged from the experiences of zone programs in developing 
countries and is organized around three main issues of critical 
interest to policy makers: 
(i)  Making economic zones successful in attracting firms that 
create jobs, 
(ii)  Ensuring zones are economically sustainable and deliver 
positive externalities, including facilitating upgrading and 
structural transformation, and catalyzing economic re-
forms, and 
(iii)  Ensuring the sustainability of economic zones from an in-
stitutional, social, and environmental perspective.
Attracting Investment and Creating Jobs: 
Old Models and New Challenges
Regardless of the model, it is clear that some countries have 
been more successful than others in using zones to attract FDI, 
encourage export-oriented production, and create jobs. Indeed, 
after reviewing the experiences of economic zones across many 
countries over the past three decades, some clear principles 
emerge regarding the policies and practices that are associated 
with “static” success.
The case of Bangladesh emphasizes the importance of posi-
tioning the zone program to leverage the country’s comparative 
advantage. Indeed, while the program in Bangladesh initially 
aimed to attract high-technology investment, it only took off 
when it made a concerted effort to focus on the garment sector, 
which allowed it to leverage its comparative advantage in low-
wage labor. It also highlights another observation about SEZs—
their incubation period. Even the biggest SEZ success stories 
like China and Malaysia started slowly and took at least 5 to 10 
years to build momentum. In Bangladesh, the program started 
in the early 1980s, but only began to attract investment on a 
large scale in the early 1990s. From a policy perspective, this 
means that governments need to be patient and to provide con-
sistent support to zone programs over long time periods, a par-
ticular challenge in countries whose political cycles are shorter. 
Beyond the wage-based advantages of Bangladesh, the critical 
contribution of the zone program was not in fact incentives, 
which are relatively modest in global terms, but instead the pro-
vision of serviced industrial land infrastructure and relatively 
reliable supply of power. Indeed, recent research (Farole 2011) 
shows that on a global basis, infrastructure reliability has a sig-
nificant impact on SEZ success, while incentives have had no 
measurable effect.
Another example is Honduras, which has also been highly 
successful in attracting investment in the garment sector, but 
has faced challenges in maintaining competitiveness. While 
the Honduran free zone program was built on trade prefer-
ences, labor cost arbitrage and a certain amount of “good tim-
ing,” this was just the starting point. Key to success was the 
role of dynamic, local entrepreneurs in catalyzing foreign in-
vestment. While it is too simplistic to say that private sector 
development of zones is better than public sector develop-
ment (bearing in mind the success of many East Asian coun-
tries and of Mauritius with public sector–led models), in 
many countries the private sector can be much more dynamic 
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of expertise and risk management. In the case of Honduras, a 
stagnant government-run zone program was transformed 
when the law was changed to allow for private development of 
zones. Government then focused on providing not only the 
regulatory framework in which the private sector thrived, but 
also critical infrastructure and services, most notably a high 
quality port, road connections to the zones, and on-site cus-
toms services that provide investors with efficient import and 
export procedures.
In contrast, the generally unsuccessful experience of zones 
in Africa to date highlights some important lessons in zone de-
velopment. First, it is important to separate political support 
from political objectives in zone projects. While strong com-
mitment from government is needed, projects must be care-
fully designed based on clear strategic plans—the commercial 
case must be there. Moreover, that commercial case must be 
based on sustainable sources of competitiveness. Second, de-
spite the concept of zones as enclaves, in practice their success is 
almost fully entwined with the competitiveness of the national 
economy and the national investment environment. Many 
zones in Africa are operating in an environment of poor nation-
al competitiveness. And regardless of what is done inside the 
zones, they face challenges in linking the zones and global mar-
kets, including critical infrastructure challenges regarding 
ports, roads, and electricity. Third, putting in place a clear and 
transparent legal and regulatory framework codifies the pro-
gram strategy and establishes the “rules of the game” for all 
stakeholders involved in the process, but de facto implementa-
tion is of equal importance. In many SEZs, the authority re-
sponsible for developing, promoting, and regulating the pro-
gram lacks resources and capacity as well as the institutional 
authority to carry out its mandate. 
Economic zones also face changing regulatory environ-
ments. One example of this is the growth of regional trade 
agreements and of regional integration more broadly. If a 
zone-based firm is prohibited from selling to the domestic 
market, but suddenly the regional trade agreement makes its 
neighboring countries “domestic” from a customs perspec-
tive, this will have an enormous impact on investors’ business 
models and on the attractiveness of zones. From an institu-
tional perspective, it will be increasingly critical for zone pro-
grams to look beyond their borders and develop integrated or 
at least harmonized approaches to SEZ legal and regulatory 
frameworks, particularly on the treatment of exports, rules of 
origin, and fiscal incentives. Regional integration offers signifi-
cant opportunities for economic zones in terms of expanding 
market access. Perhaps more interestingly, particularly for 
small countries, there may be potential for using zones to link 
up regional suppliers and leverage economies of scale in pro-
duction. Linking regional SEZs to infrastructure investments 
to create “growth corridors” may be a powerful new route to 
competitiveness.
Moving from Static to Dynamic Gains: Can 
SEZs Deliver Structural Change?
For economic zones to be a success in the long term, they 
should contribute to structural transformation of the econo-
my, including diversification, upgrading, and increased open-
ness. This requires leveraging dynamic economic benefits from 
investment and employment. Countries that have been suc-
cessful in deriving long-term economic benefits from their SEZ 
programs have established the conditions for ongoing exchange 
and the accompanying hard and soft technology transfer be-
tween the domestic economy and investors based on the zones. 
This includes investment by domestic firms into the zones, for-
ward and backward links, business support, and the seamless 
movement of skilled labor and entrepreneurs between the 
zones and the domestic economy.
From a policy perspective, this suggests shifting from a tra-
ditional fenced-in EPZ model to an SEZ model that eliminates 
legal restrictions on forward and backward links and domestic 
participation. But it will also require implementation of much 
broader policies beyond the scope of any SEZ program, in-
cluding: promoting skills development, training, and knowl-
edge sharing; promoting industry clusters and targeting links 
with zone-based firms at the cluster level; supporting the inte-
gration of regional value chains; supporting public-private in-
stitutions, both industry specific and transversal; and ensur-
ing labor markets are free to facilitate skilled labor moving 
across firms.
The case of the Dominican Republic, for example, high-
lights that while low labor costs, trade preferences, and fiscal 
incentives can each play a role in catalyzing a zone program, 
they are almost never sustainable. Indeed, they create pressure 
for further distortions and “race-to-the-bottom” policies, in-
cluding extending and increasing incentives (rather than ad-
dressing more difficult factors of the investment environment) 
and granting exemptions on minimum wage and labor rights 
(rather than addressing productivity or labor market rigidities).
For the Dominican Republic, and many other lower-middle-
income countries whose zone programs have focused on basic 
assembly, manufacturing and trade, the main growth opportu-
nities are now in services sectors, especially information and 
communication technology (ICT), business services, and more 
knowledge- and research and development– (R&D) intensive 
sectors. This requires fostering innovation, which emphasizes 
the need for zones to avoid becoming enclaves, as well as the 
importance of skills development and training. 
But facilitating structural transformation through SEZs is 
not a mechanical process that simply requires the right policies. 
The principal factors explaining why many countries have dis-
torted economic structures and lack sufficient dynamism are 
political in nature. It is in this context that SEZs can perhaps be 
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deed, this is the classic case of China’s SEZs, which were used as 
a vehicle to test liberal economic reforms and introduce them 
to the wider economy in a gradual way. Thus, while the idea of 
integration between SEZs and the domestic economy is ulti-
mately the key to structural transformation, where economic 
reforms are politically sensitive to implement, it is precisely the 
enclave nature of zones that can be their key to success.
Several important lessons can be drawn from the Mauritius 
case, which represents another example of how SEZs can cata-
lyze structural change through economic and political reform. 
First, it highlights the importance of the political process and 
of having a specific political champion behind the zone pro-
gram, a lesson that was also learned from experiences in China 
and Malaysia (especially Penang). Second, not only does the 
Mauritius case again emphasize the importance of domestic 
investment in the zone program, it shows that integration of 
the zone program must go beyond the physical and financial—
it must also be integrated strategically. Indeed, one of the main 
differences between zone programs that have been successful 
and sustainable and those that have either failed to take off or 
have become stagnant enclaves is the degree to which they have 
been integrated into the broader economic policy framework 
of the country. In Mauritius, the EPZ program was a pillar of 
the country’s development strategy. Unlocking the potential of 
zones requires clear strategic integration of the program, with 
government playing a leading, active role in facilitating their 
growth and development vis-à-vis the local economy. 
Sustainability: Emerging Issues for SEZs
SEZ impacts on host societies go well beyond economic effi-
ciency. Zone programs that fail to offer opportunities for qual-
ity employment and upward mobility for trained staff, derive 
their competitive advantage from exploiting low-wage workers, 
and neglect to ensure environmental sustainability are unlikely 
to be successful in achieving the possible dynamic benefits, and 
are likely to be forced into a “race to the bottom.” By contrast, 
zone programs that recognize the value of skilled workers and 
seek to provide the social infrastructure and working environ-
ment in which such workers thrive will be in a position to fa-
cilitate upgrading.
One example in which sustainability is getting attention in 
economic zones is in the area of gender. Firms located in eco-
nomic zones are known to have much more female-intensive 
employment than firms in the rest of the economy (Milberg 
and Amengual 2008). In this regard, zones have created an im-
portant avenue for young women to enter the formal economy. 
On the other hand, zones have long been criticized for failing to 
meet labor standards, particularly for not appropriately consid-
ering the specific needs of female workers. Moreover, as firms 
and zones upgrade—both into new, higher value-added sectors 
and to higher value-added within existing sectors—the share of 
females in the labor force tends to decline. Thus, countries that 
remain wed to traditional labor-intensive, low-skill EPZ activi-
ties will be forced in time to adjust, and it will be critical to con-
sider the economic and social implications some of these ad-
justments may have. 
Ensuring that the rights of workers are upheld and, beyond 
this, that efforts are made to provide the training and social in-
frastructure needed to enable individual workers to thrive, will 
ultimately be critical to ensuring the sustainability of zone pro-
grams so they can deliver the dynamic economic benefits dis-
cussed in this note. Thus, zone programs will need to strength-
en their approach to social and environmental compliance 
issues, establish clear standards, and put in place effective mon-
itoring and evaluation (M&E) programs. At the national policy 
level, economic zones should be seen as an opportunity to ex-
periment with policy innovations.
These same principles—of policy experimentation, clear 
standards, and robust M&E—are also applicable in the environ-
mental field. Some EPZs have been criticized in the past for 
promoting “dirty” industries and failing to meet environmental 
standards. SEZs, however, offer an ideal environment for envi-
ronmental policy experimentation, not only because of their 
enclave nature, but also because they have built-in compliance 
mechanisms that do not typically exist outside the zones, such 
as issuing of licenses, the ability to monitor firms in a short time 
frame, and ultimately the ability to revoke a license, terminate 
a lease, or impound goods. This context could offer interesting 
opportunities, particularly for innovations in both social and 
environmental policy. Indeed, while the concept of developing 
low-carbon zones is still in its infancy, it is already being adopt-
ed in several SEZs around the world. 
Conclusions 
As SEZ programs continue to proliferate, particularly in devel-
oping countries, it is critical for policy makers to learn from 
past experiences and anticipate the implications of the emerg-
ing and potential issues discussed in this note. Future SEZ pro-
gram success will require adopting a more flexible approach to 
use SEZ instruments effectively to leverage a country’s com-
parative advantage and ensure flexibility so that the zone pro-
gram can evolve over time. Fundamentally, this approach will 
require a shift in mindset away from the traditional reliance 
on fiscal incentives and wage restraint to instead focus on fa-
cilitating a more effective business environment that fosters 
firm-level competitiveness, local economic integration, inno-
vation, and social and environmental sustainability. This ap-
proach will also require proactive, flexible, and innovative 
policy approaches to address the significant macroeconomic 
challenges that will impact SEZs in the near future, in addi-
tion to the many unanticipated challenges that will undoubt-
edly also shape the environment in the years to come. 5  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK     www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
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